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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role of interest rates, commodity prices,
growth in bringing the debt crisis about and how they facilitated or made more
difficult the first five years of adjustment. We also ask whether and how the
world macroeconomy is likely to contribute to the solution of the debt problem
in the next five years.
The paper starts with a conceptual framework and a review of
the behavior of key macroeconomic variables in the past quarter of a century.
Next the origins of the debt crisis are discussed as well as the adjustment
period, 1982—1987. The following part reviews alternative scenarios for the
period 1987-90 and their bearing on debt questions. We also ask what
contribution to expect from commercial policies. The paper concludes
pessimistically that for many debtors there is not a sufficient improvement to
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This paper discusses the role of world macroeconomic factors in
contributing to the debt crisis. We investigate what role these factors———
interest rates, commodity prices, growth—- played in bringing the debt crisis
about and how they facilitated or made more difficult the first five years of
adjustment. We also ask whether and how the world macroeconomy is likely to
contribute to the solution of the debt problem in the next five years.
The paper starts with a conceptual framework and a review of
the behavior of key macroeconomic variables in the past quarter of a century.
From there we proceed to a discussion of the origins of the debt crisis, and
to the adjustment period, 1982—1987. The following part reviews alternative
scenarios for the period 1987-90 and their bearing on debt questions. We also
ask what contribution to expect from commercial policies. The paper concludes
pessimistically that for many debtors there is not a sufficient improvement to
be expected from good performance of the world economy. This makes it
necessary to find mechanisms tho make it possible to bring about a reversal
of resource flows.
I. EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEBT CRISIS: A FRAMEWORK
In this part of the paper we set out a conceptual framework to discuss
debt problems and the macroeconomic background to the debt crisis in 1979—82.2
1. A Conceptual Framework
The balance of payments and national income accounts provide a basic
framework of analysis. The identities-relations which are true always and
anywhere by accounting definition—-are an objective conceptual setting.
There is a debt problem when a country cannot service its debt on the
contracted schedule. Debt service difficulties may either be an ability to pay
the principal of a maturing debt, as is the case for Colombia or Venezuela
today, or an ability to pay both interest and principal. We focus here on debt
difficulties of the more serious kind where interest cannot be paid. The
reason is that difficulties inpayingprincipal, when interest is regularly
paid, should not present any difficulty since rolling over is a routine
operation. The only reason difficulties with principal can become debt
problems is if creditors wish to limit their regional exposure and hence
insist on payment of principal even from those countries who are good debtors.
Focusing on interest payments, the current account of the balance of
payments can be separated into two components: the noninterest current
account (NICA) which includes trade in goods and in all services except
interest payments on the external debt on the one hand, and interest payments
on the other. Interest payments can be financed by noninterest surpluses or by
net capital inflows:
(1) Interest Payments =NoninterestCurrent +NetCapital
Account Inf low3
The category "net capital inflows" includes four categories: reserve
decumulation, direct foreign investment inflows, longterin portfolio inflows
and short or medium term borrowing abroad which is often called "new money".
In the debt problems of the interwar period or the period preceding 1914 new
money took the form of a "funding loan". Today it is concerted or involuntary
lending by the commercial bank creditors and multilateral institutions.
Table 1 shows these current account components for problem debtor
countries in the 1978—87 period. 1
Table 1 The Current Account Deficit and External Debt:
Countries With Recent Debt Servicing Difficulties
(Billion $)
Noninterest Interest Current External
Cur.Account Payments Account Debt
(Resource Transfer) Deficit
1978 17.1 14.8 31.9 242
1979 10.1 21.8 31.9 292
1980 5.0 34.3 39.6 356
1981 20.2 47.5 677 430
1982 5.4 57.5 63.1 494
1983 —30.2 52.1 21.9 514
1984 —48.6 57.2 8.6 534
1985 —50.2 53.6 3.1 553
1986 —32.7 50.2 17.5 573
1987 —27.8 45.7 17.9 586
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
Table 1 reveals the turn in the noninterest current account from a4
string of deficits until 1982 to a series of surpluses. In the period up to
1982 both interest payments and the noninterest deficit both need financing
and hence are reflected in a rapidly rising debt. Since 1983 a large part of
interest is paid by noninterest surpluses and hence the increase in debt is
sharply reduced. But debt is still rising, reflecting the financing of the
remaining interest payments not met by the surplus, and the financing of
capital flight and reserve build—up.
(2) Interest =NoninterestCurrent +NewMoney +OtherNet Capital
Payments Account Inflows
The category "other net capital flows" is typically very small. There is
little room for reserve decumulation and longterm capital flows tend to be
small. The only time other net capital flows assume importance is in the case
of capital flight or, less frequent a repatriation of capital.
Table 2 Financing of Imbalances of Problem Debtors
(Billion $U.S.)
1979_82a 1983_86a 1987
Current Account Deficit' 39.5 7.8 14.8
Non—Debt Creating 7.1 4.6 5.1
Inf lows
Net Borrowing 49.4 11.6 16.3
aperiod Average, bDeficiton goods, services and private transfers.5
The discrepancy between the current account on one side and the sum of
net borrowing plus non—debt creating inf lows (chiefly direct foreign
investment and official aid) represents reserve changes and capital flight.
The noninterest deficit is often called the net resource transfer
since it measures the net imports of goods and services (other than interest)
over which a country acquires command. Noninterest deficits are the normal
pattern for developing countries in which saving is low relative to
investment. Noninterest deficits are the channel through which resources are
transferred from rich to poor countries to support capital formation and
growth in the developing world. Private and public lending forms the
financial counterpart. Using the national accounts identities we can represent
the financing of investment from the resource point of view as is done in (3)
below.
(3) Investment =Saving+RealResource Transfer
From Abroad
Table 3 shows the real resource transfers and the investment rates for
Latin America. The Table brings out strikingly the decline in investment as a
counterpart of the real resource transfer abroad. The shift in resource
transfers is almost exactly matched by a decline in investment.6
Table 3 Resource Transfers and Investment
(Percent of GDP)
1973—82 1983—85
Gross Investment 24.3 18.5
Noninterest Surplus —0.6 4.7
The essential distinction between pre—crisis and post—crisis is the
turn of the net resource balance. Now debtor countries are making net
resource transfers to creditor countries.
2. Debt Crises
Any debt crisis involves the inability of debtors to meet timely
payments of interest and principal. Thus the gap between interest payments
that are due and the noninterest current account (NICA) is the chief
characteristic of a debt problem. Four factors then can be identified as
leading to a debt problem:
.Withan unchanged willingness to roll over debt and provide a given
flow of new money, an increase in real interest rates raises the financing
requirement. The imbalance between new money requirements and credit
voluntarily supplied brings about a debt crisis.7
• A deterioration in the noninterest current account, because of
domestic macroeconomics or because of a worsening in the terms of trade or a
fall in export demand, opens a financing gap,
• An increase in world inflation leads to an increase in nominal
interest rates and hence to an early real amortization of the external debt.
Although real interest rates are unchanged there is a cash flow problem for
debtors.
• With an unchanged interest rate and noninterest current account
creditors decide that exposure is excessive and therefore limit new money
commitments and require that maturing principal be paid off.
We now proceed to identify the impact of world macroeconomic events
on debtor countries. Specifically, given policies such as the real exchange
rate and fiscal policy, how has the world macroeconomy been one of the factors
in leading to the debt crisis, how has it influenced the evolution of the debt
problems since 1982 and what implications can be anticipated from alternative
scenarios of the world economy in the coming years? World interest rates,
growth and commodity price trends are at the center of the discussion.
But a special interest attaches to their joint behavior. For example,
if the interest payments a country owes increase but the noninterest deficit
also increases. At the same time creditors become unwilling to increase their
exposure. The financing equation then no longer adds up and something must
give. When a debt crisis occurs and outright default or arrears are not the8
answer creditors are often coerced into involuntary lending and debtors
undergo adjustment programs to turn their noninterest deficits into surpluses.
Creditworthiness is to be reestablished. Now debtors have noninterest
surpluses which finance the interest payments. But there may still be a part
of interest payments financed by net capital inflows or "new money".
With this background in mind we now turn to the main world
macroeconomic variables that had an influence in creating the debt crisis.
II. THE WORLD MACROECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
Figures 1 to 4 highlight the chief external variables for debtor
countries——the interest rate, the real interest rate, the real price of
commodities and world economic activity. In Figure 1 we show the London inter
bank offer rate for dollar deposits (LIBOR). The contribution of interest
rates to the debt crisis is shown by the peak level of an interest rate in
excess of 18 percent in late 1981.
The interest rate effects appear through two separate channels. One is
associated with the level of nominal rates, given the real rate of interest.
When higher inflation increases the nominal interest rate the effect on
debtors is a shortening of the effective maturity of the debt. The real value
of the debt is amortized at a faster pace. As a result debtors may experience
liquidity problems.
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In this context it must be decided in terms of which rate of inflation the
real interest rate should be assessed and there is considerable difficulty in
identifying the correct inflation rate. Alternative candidates might be the
debtor countries' GNP deflator in dollars or the rate of inflation in world
trade. We chose here the latter series and it is shown in Figure 2 together
with the Libor rate. The behavior of the real rate is, of course, striking in
that the sharp increase in nominal rates was accompanied by a falling level of
prices in world trade. The combination implied that real interest rate facing
debtor countries were much higher than 20 percent per year.
Figure 3 shows the real price of commodities. The series shown here is
the 1MF index of all (non-oil) commodities deflated by the export unit value
of industrial countries. Commodity prices show a steady decline since their
peak levels in 1973—74. By late 1986 they had fallen to only 40 percent of the
peak level. But in the early 1980s, when the debt crisis first broke out, the
real price of commodities did not show a dramatic deterioration. Commodity
prices thus are not an immediate source of the crisis but they did become
relevant later in raising the costs of adjustment for several debtor
countries.
Figure 4 shows world economic activity measured by the index of
industrial production in the industrialized countries. The behavior of the
index is relatively smooth. The events of the early 1980s do not appear













0libor (%) 4-cornpric irtfktior
Figure 2
100
Libor () andCommodity Pricenflation
(4thquirtr infkitkrn)



































Commodity Prices and Export Prices
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Table 4 shows data for these aggregate indices. The Table reports the
averages for the 1960s and 1970s and more detailed information on the period
of the debt crisis.
Table 4 Aggregate World Macroeconomic Indicators
Real Commodity Libor Inflationb World Activityc
Prices (1980100)a % (1980=100)
1960—69 115 5.2 1.0 56
1970—79 -115 8.0 11.4 86
1980 100 14.4 13.0 100
1981 96 16.5 —4.1 100
1982 89 13.1 —3.5 96
1983 98 9.6 —3.3 99
1984 101 10.8 —2.5 106
1985 88 8.3 —0.4 110
1986 72 6.9 13.7 110
aMeasuredin terms manufactures export prices of industrial countries.b Rate
of inflation of industrial countries' unit export values. cIndustrial
production.
Source: IMF and Economic Commission for Latin America
In addition to interest rates, real commodity prices and economic
activity in industrial countries a fourth external factor influences the
noninterest current account. This is commercial policies in developing
countries and their influence on market access and hence export performance.
There are no good aggregate indicators of market access or of changes in
market access. But there is also no suggestion that this factor would have
been an important element in provoking the debt crisis. Of course, that does
not mean that protectionism did not increase the costs and difficulties of
debtor countries once the crisis had started. 211
III. EXAMPLES OF THE EFFECT OF THE WORLD MACRO SHOCK
The broad overview of external factors gives little guidance to what
was the incidence on individual debtors. Their common factor is only to be
debtors and hence to be hurt by an increase in world interes.t rates. But even
that exposure differs significantly across countries depending on the share of
floating rate debt. At one end of the spectrum are poor debtors with most of
their debt at concessional rates, at the other end are Brazil or Mexico for
whom almost the entire debt has interest rates linked to market rates.
But differences in trade structure also matter and these imply
differential effects among debtor countries of movements in commodity prices
or in economic activity in industrial countries. Korea, for example, imports
commodities while Brazil or Argentina are net commodity exporters. To
investigate these differential impacts of the 1980s external shock we now look
at a number of cases of individual countries' experiences.
Brazil: Brazil exports commodities and also manufactures. In the early 1980s
the country had just become a predominant exporter of manufactures. Of a total
of $24 billion in exports in 1981 nearly 38 percent were primary commodities
(coffee, iron, soya, sugar) and the remainder manufactures. But much of
manufactured exports had a high import content, as for example steel or orange
juice. On the import side a striking 51 percent was oil. Of the external debt12
of $50 billion, 80 percent was at variable interest rates and more than eighty
percent was dollar denominated.
For Brazil, therefore oil prices and the world money market rate were
the chief variables of interest. Being a net exporter of (non oil) commodities
a decline in real commodity prices on balance would hurt. But the
concentration in exports on coffee, orange juice soya and iron ore would be
important to note.
The external balance problem, of course, originated in the oil price
increase of 1978—79. Oil imports increased from $4.5 billion in 1978 to $11.4
billion in 1981. This increase in the oil bill was automatically financed both
in the budget and in the current account by the borrowing of the State
enterprises in the world capital market.
The increase in world interest rates in 1979—81 added to the interest
bill. In 1979 net interest payments amounted to $4.2 billion. By 1981 they had
risen to 9.2 billion and in 1982 to $12.6 billion. At the end of 1978 the
external debt was only $44 billion and by the end of 1981 it had risen to $61
billion and by the end of 1982 to $70 billion. The increase in LIBOR from 8.9
percent in 1978 to 12, 14 and 17 percent over the next three years added
immediately a cumulative $7 billion to the external debt. The combination of
higher interest rates and higher oil prices "explains" almost the entire
increase in debt between the end of 1978 and the end of 1981.13
The fact that higher interest rates and higher oil prices explain the
increase in debt can also be read to say that the failure to adjust to these
external shocks, and the ability to borrow in world markets, meant that
external debt was the means by which the country financed the impact of the
external shock.
Mexico: The second oil price increase in 1978-79 provided an apparently sound
basis on which to engage in a growth strategy. Petroleum export revenue
increased from only $1 billion in 1977 to $14 billion in 1981. But spending
increased far ahead of the increased revenues. The noninterest budget deficit,
oil revenues notwithstanding, increased from 2 to more than 8 percent of GDP.
The current account deteriorated even though oil revenues doubled every year.
The strong domestic expansion, combined with a fixed exchange rate
built up overvaluation. The extent of overvaluation at no point became as
extreme as it had been in Chile or Argentina. But even so it led to
significant deterioration in the trade balance and to massive capital flight.
Table 5 Mexico's Macroeconomy: 1977—81
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Account Deficit 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.4 5.8 3.8
(% of GDP)
Real Exchange Rate 93 94 98 104 114 83
(1980—82=100)
Source: Morgan Guaranty and Banco de Mexico14
The capital flight was concentrated in the period 1981—82, in the
final phase of the Portillo Lopez government. The deterioration in the
external balance and the increasing difficulty in financing the deficit made
it apparent that an exchange crisis was around the corner. Large wage
increases led to an expectation of a sharp increase in inflation altogether
incompatible with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. With no
restrictions on capital flows there occurred then a massive flight into the
dollar. In fact, the capital flight would have been much larger had it not
been for the existence of domestic dollar deposits in the banking system.
These Mex-dollar accounts absorbed a good part of the speculation, although
their holders ultimately did much worse than those who bought the real thing.
Estimates of the amount of capital flight from Mexico in 1978—82
differ. A recent study by Cuddington (1987) estimates a total of more than $25
billion whereas Morgan Guaranty (1986) gives a higher number of $36 billion.
Whatever the exact number, there is no question that somewhere between 10 and
15 percent of GDP went abroad in these critical years. And the reason is
exclusively mismanagement since, unlike in the case of Argentina or Chile,
there was no deterioration in external conditions until interest rates
increased. On- the contrary, the oil price increase had provided an
extraordinary gain in real income and a potential improvement in the external
balance.15
Argentina: The Argentinian external; debt problems were largely due to a
mismanagement of the exchange rate. The overvaluation of 1978—81, combined
with the liberalization of capital flows, brought about massive capital
flight.
Table 6 shows the basic data. Note the large real appreciation in
1978-80 and the terms of trade improvement up to 1981. The oil price increase
which was important for Mexico, Brazil or Korea had no effect on Argentina's
terms of trade since the country is selfsufficient in oil.
Table 6Argentinan Macroeconomic Variables: 1978—82
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Debt/GDP 23.9 30.2 37.3 48.1 60.3
Current Account
as % of GDP 4.0 —1.0 —7.6 —7.4 —3.8
Terms of Tradea 84 88 100 114 99
Real Exchange Ratea 65 84 100 70 49
alndex 1980=100
The increase in external debt in Argentina far exceeds the cumulative
current account. Therefore interest rate and terms of trade shocks cannot
account for the major part of the debt problem before 1981. On the contrary,
overvaluation and capital flight are the chief problems in this period. As we
shall see below this is no longer the case after 1982 when the terms of trade
deterioration becomes an important issue.16
Korea: As an oil importer Korea experienced a major deterioration in the terms
of trade. The interest rate shock reinforced the external balance
deterioration. But even so, by 1982 the external balance had already turned
around an the deficit had become more moderate. In part this is a reflection
of the real depreciation which restored competitiveness in the years following
the crisis of 1980. In part it reflects a successful policy of exporting labor
services to the oilproducing countries.
Table 7 Korean Macroeconomic Variables
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Terms of Tradea 118 115 100 98 102
Net Exports of Goods —3.0 -7.3 —7.8 —5.4 —2.6
and Nonfactor Servicesa
Net Factor Payments —1.3 -1.5 -3.3 —4.0 —4.1
From Abroadb
a Index 1980=100 •bPercentof GDP, National Income Accounts
Chile: The Chilean case, just as that of Argentina and Mexico, reflects until
1982 primarily a mismanaged exchange rate rather than a predominance of
external shocks. As shown in Table 8 the terms of trade initially improve and
the deterioration of the external balance is above all due to the
extraordinary overvaluation.17
Table 8Chilean Macroeconomic Variables
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Terms of Tradea 94 106 100 86 77
Real Exchange Rateb 91 100 120 136 122
Trade Balancec —0.4 —0.4 —0.7 —2.7 0
Current Accountc —1.1 —1.1 —2.0 4.7 —2.3
alndex 1980100, blndex 1980—82=100, C Billion $
Source:CIEPLAN and Morgan Guaranty
Only in 1981—82 do international factors take over and deteriorate the
external balance via increased interest burdens. In 1981 the overvaluation and
the external factors combine to yield record deficits. But by 1982 exchange
rate adjustment and domestic restraint already compensate on the trade side
and the current account deterioration only reflects increased interest rate
burdens.
Conclusion: The examples illustrate that external factors were by no means the
only factor in the debt crisis. On the contrary, domestic policies were an
important and often main influence in bringing about a large accumulation of
debt. External factors reinforced the impact of these debts in 1981—82 via the
interest rate shock.18
IV. THE PERIOD 1982-1987
In this part we investigate how the world macroeconomy influenced the
debt problem in the period since 1982. We start with a review of the beliefs
of 1982, namely that favorable trends in the world economy would significantly
facilitate debt service. From there we go to a more detailed consideration of
the actual evolution of the world economy to ask whether world macroeconomic
conditions in fact facilitated debt service or added to the burdens.
1. The Beliefs of 1982
When in 1982 Mexico, and shortly afterwards a host of Latin American
countries, encountered acute debt service problems the process of concerted or
involuntary lending started. The basic philosophy of that process had three
ingredients:
• To assure an ultimate return to voluntary lending it was essential
that debtor countries should service their debts to the maximum extent
possible, on commercial terms and without significant concessions other than
in respect to the maturity of the debt principal.
• Adjustments in debtor countries, specifically in the budget and
exchange rates, would go far to bringing about a swing in the noninterest
balance so as to service debt.
• The world macroeconomy would make a substantial contribution in
reducing the burden of debt servicing. From the vantage point of 1982 the19
macroeconomy could only improve. Debtor countries could anticipate higher
growth in demand for their exports, lower interest rates, and improving terms
of trade.
The question of adjustment in debtor countries is beyond the scope of
this paper and has been amply dealt with elsewhere.3 The issue of interest
here is the contribution of the world macroeconomy. Certainly in 1982 the
outlook must have been favorable.
• The world economy was in the deepest recession since the 1930s. In
the recovery period there had to be, accordingly, an expectation of growth
significantly above trend. This growth would bring about two results. First it
would mean an increase in demand for manufactures exports from debtor
countries. Second it would translate into a cyclical upturn of real commodity
prices. These stylized facts were quite beyond doubt, given the ample
empirical evidence on the cyclical behavior of real commodity prices and
export volumes.4
• In respect to interest rates the outlook also had to be outright
favorable. The short term interest rate was at record high levels in American
history. These high levels of interest rates were an immediate result of a
deliberate attempt to use monetary policy to stop the sharply accelerating
U.S. inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. With the success of
disinflation interest rates would decline and hence the extraordinary debt
service burdens of 1982 would come down.20
. Even though the dollar had appreciated already for more than a year
there was not much discussion on this issue. The reason was presumably that
dollar appreciation started from a very low point so that overvaluation was
not yet a relevant notion. Nor was there an expectation of significant further
appreciation. Discussion of a contribution of dollar depreciation to the debt
crisis only occurred over the next three years as dollar overvaluation became
increasingly apparent.
The framework for analysis of debt problems became rapidly the
Avromovic-Cline model of debt dynamics, focusing on the ratio of debt to
exports, b. The key question was whether the evolution of the world
macroeconomy made declining ratios of debt to exports likely. The evolution of
the debt—export ratio over time (b) can be developed in term of several
determinants, specifically interest rate (i), the growth rate of export prices
(px) and the growth rate of export volume (x):
(4) b =b(i—px—x)—v;
where v denotes the noninterest current account surplus as a ratio of exports.
Equation (4) highlights that debt problems in the sense of an ever
rising debt to export ratio. Such a course is unlikely if the real interest
rate, defined as nominal rates less the rate of inflation of export prices, is
less than the growth rate of export volume and if there is a noninterest21
current account surplus. Table 9 shows the longterm averages for some of these
variables to use as a benchmark.
Table 9 Longterm Average Growth Rates: 1969—78
Libor Export Prices Export VolumeDebt Ratioa
Asia 7.8 10.1 10.8 75.7
Western Hem. 7.8 13.9 1.7 197.7
Problem Debtors 7.8 12.1 2.3 164.3
a Ratio of debt to exports of goods and services in 1979
Source: IMF
With the data for problem debtors, and assuming a spread over Libor of
2.2 percent we observe that the debt—export ratio would be declining unless
there was a noninterest current account deficit in excess of 7 percent of
exports. Of course, in 1978—82 the deficits were in fact much larger.
The expectation of declining nominal interest rates and cyclically
rising nominal and real export prices for debtor countries implied an
expectation of ow real interest rates. Recovery and sustained growth in the
industrial countries was expected to translate into significant growth in
export volumes.
Adjustment in debtor countries, both in terms of expenditure cutting
and real depreciation, was expected to translate into significant export
growth and into an increased noninterest current account surplus. Thus for
every element in the debt dynamics equation a favorable scenario could easily
be predicted. And if there was any pessimism on real interest rates and growth22
inexport volume, the fact of non—interest current account surpluses provided
the necessary leeway to make a trend reduction in debt burdens plausible.
Cline (1983) in particular expressed the view that the debt problem
was largely under control. Using simulations for the major debtor countries,
and assuming alternative scenarios for the world economy he showed that for
most debtor countries there was an expectation of declining debt-export
ratios. Moreover, the gain in creditworthiness implied by a reduced debt—
income ratio in several cases could be accompanied by significant growth in
the debtor countries. Brazil, for example, could in Cline's simulations
achieve both an average growth rate of 6 percent and a reduction in its debt—
export ratio. The Cline analysis rightly emphasized the crucial role of oil
prices in determining the relative performance of Mexico and Brazil. With the
assumption of declining oil prices Mexico was a problem country and Brazil's
prospects were relatively bright.
Table 10 shows a mediumterm scenario developed by the IMF in 1982 as
well as the actual outcome for the key variables. The IMF scenario assumed a
strong internal adjustment in the debtor countries, continued inflation
fighting in the industrial countries, a constant real price of oil at the 1982
level and a sharply declining real Libor rate. Table 10 reports three
scenarios: The base line scenario is labelled A, scenario B is pessimistic and
hence imposes extra adjustment requirements on debtors, and scenario C is
optimistic. The optimism and pessimism are judged in terms of the growth—23
inflation mix in industrial countries. There was apparently no recognition at
the time of the real interest rate consequences of rapid disinflation and of
the U.S. monetary-fiscal mix. The other respect in which the scenario is
interesting is that there was a quite explicit confidence that current account
imbalances could be financed.
Table 10 The 1982 IMF Scenarios for Non—Oil Developing Countries
(Average annual rates for 1984—86 except as noted)
A B C Actual
Industrial Country Growth 3.2 2.2 4.3 3.1
Industrial Country Inflation 5.5 8.0 4.5 3.8
Real Libor Ratea 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.4
Net Oil Importers
Export Volume 7.6 5.9 9.2 8.1
Terms of Trade —0.5 —1.7 0.9 0.7
Net Oil Exporters
Export Volume 5.0 4.0 6.0 3.6
Terms of Trade 0 -1.0 1.0 —10.0
1986 Current Account'
Net Oil Importers —13.7 —19.4 —9.0 —1.4
Net Oil Exporters —20.6 —27.0 —17.5 —16.8
ausjng the U.S. GNP deflator. bpercent of exports of goods and services
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 1982 and April 1987
2. The Actual Experience Since 198224
The actual outcome shown in Table 10 differs from the IMF scenario in
the following respects:
• Real interest rates continued to be far higher than expected. The
U.S. monetary-fiscal mix this ha strong implications for the performance of
countries with high debt ratios and a high ratio of floating rate debt.
• The real oil price fell dramatically and hence the relative
performance of net oil exporters was due more to their adjustment efforts then
to favorable terms of trade.
The assumption that debtor countries could afford to run significant
current account deficits was overly optimistic. Financing constraints in fact
limited these deficits.
Table 11 shows further details on nominal interest rates, real oil
prices and on commodity prices which were only addressed in the terms of trade
category of Table 10.
Table 11 Commodity Prices, Oil Prices and Interest Rates
(Average Annual Percent)
Commodity Prices Interest Ratesa Real Oilb
1969—78 9.8 7.8
1980—1982 —4.1 14.8 100
1983—1986 —3.4 8.9 80
a Libor bDeflated by manufactures prices, Index 1980—8210O
Source: IMF
Nominal interest rates did, indeed, decline significantly from their25
peak levels and OECD growth showed somewhat above the 3 percent threshold that
had been set as a benchmark for solving debt problems. The significant
difference from the 1982 outlook was in respect to commodity prices. Rather
than showing a recovery in nominal and real terms they in fact continued to
decline. The decline was so significant that in 1986 they were at a lower
level than anytime in the preceding quarter of a century as already shown in
Figure 3 above. In nominal terms they had fallen back to the level of 1977.
Creditworthiness: The belief that debt and debt service ratios would decline
has not in fact been borne out as shown in Table 12. On every measure of
creditworthiness debtor countries today look worse than they were in 1982,
excepting the debt service ratio. The reduction in interest rates since 1982
clearly helped reduce the service ratio as did the longterm restructuring of
debts. But even though there is a marginal reduction in the debt service ratio
the extent of decline falls by short of the 1982 expectations.
Table 12 The Deterioration of Creditworthiness
(Percent)
Debt/GDP Debt/Exports Debt Service
1978 1982 198619781982 19861978 1982 1986
All Debtor LDCs 26 34 40 132 151 180 14 20 22
Problem Debtors 31 43 49 180254282 28 40 38
Source: IHF World Economic Outlook26
Favorable conditions in the world economy and the beneficial effects
of adjustment programs on the part of debtors were expected to show in time an
improvement in credit worthiness sufficient to warrant a return to voluntary
lending. That remains the expectation, But the process is not on schedule.
Abstracting from the oil shock, which improved the situation of Korea and
Brazil while dramatically worsening that of Mexico, there has been as yet no
improvement as dramatic as had been anticipated. Standard indicators of
creditworthiness such as the ratio of debt to GDP or debt to exports have in
fact worsened since 1982.
The return of voluntary lending was predicated on countries restoring
their credit standing. While creditworthiness is a broad and vague idea, the
operational concept was a reduction of ratios of debt to GDP and debt to
exports. Table 12 shows that since 1982 creditworthiness measured by these
benchmark ratios has worsened or at least not deteriorated, making the current
adjustment effort of debtor countries entirely openended.
The Cline Projections: While the preceding discussion focuses on group of
countries it is also of interest to see how forecasts fared in specific
country cases. The analysis by Cline (1983) provides that possibility for the
year 1985. Table 13 shows the results for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.27




Exports 10.4 8.4 29.5 25.6 23.6 21.9
Imports 6.4 3.8 18.2 13.2 16.0 13.5
Oil 7.0 5.7
Interest 6.2 5.3 13.0 9.6 10.7 9.9
Source: Cline (1984) and various government publications.
Three points stand out in these comparisons. First, that export
revenues fall short of those predicted by Cline. Second, that import spending
is much lower than Cline had predicted. Third, that interest payments are
somewhat lower than predicted by Cline. Note,though, that the Brazilian
current account surplus of 1985 was correctly predicted by Cline. Of course,
by 1986 the differences are much more pronounced because of the vast influence
of the decline in oil prices from $28 to $15 per barrel.
Extreme Cases: There are some examples of countries who are outlines in the
adjustment period since 1982. On one side countries who are predominant
exporters of commodities and borrowers primarily from official sources. They
would experience the large and continuing decline in commodity prices without
the advantage of reduced interest burdens.28
Among the countries that come to mind in this category there is
certainly Bolivia. Interest payments are to the extent of 70 percent at fixed
rates SC) that the fall in world interest rates did not bring major benefits.
But the terms of trade deteriorated over the period 1981—1986 by 14 percent.
The value of exports declined in 1984—86 cumulatively by 40 percent!
The most striking improvement in the external debt position in the
adjustment period is probably that of Korea. Korea benefited from every one of
the factors characterizing the 1982—87 period: lower commodity prices, lower
oil prices and lower interest rates. Each of these factors exerts a very
significant impact on the external balance and hence the combined effects——in
conjunction with an aggressive exchange rate policy——produced a dramatic
improvement in the external balance. The shift in the current account
represents nearly 10 percent of GNP by 1986 and is still widening.
V. THE OUTLOOK
In this section we ask whether there are important shifts in the world
macroeconomic outlook, and in the outlook for trade policies and the capital
market, that promise to help overcome the debt problem or threaten to make its
solution much more difficult. On the side of macroeconomics there is certainly
a possibility of quite different scenarios depending on the way in which the
U.S. budget problem is solved and the response of interest rates and the
dollar to budget cuts whentheydo take place.29
1. The 1987 IMF Scenario
A useful framework of reference economic outlook is the 1987 IMF
medium—term scenario shown in Table 14. The central assumption of this
scenario is a continued high real interest rate level compensated by sustained
growth in the world economy and in debtor country exports. There is an
expectation of moderately rising real oil prices and no change in the terms of
trade.
Table 14 The 1987 IMF World Economic Outlook
1987 1988 1989-91 Average
Industrial Countries
Growth 2.3 2.8 2.9
Real LIBOR 3.6 3.0 3.4
GDP Deflator 2.9 3.4 3.2
World Economy
Manufactures Prices 11.0 3.1 3.0
Oil Prices 8.7 3.1 3.0
Non—oil Commodities —4.9 5.1 4.7
Problem Debtors
Real GDP 4.4 4.7 5.0
Terms of Trade —2.1 —1.0 —
ExportVolume 5.4 5.9 5.6
Import Volume 2.5 3.6 5.7
Current Accounta —1.5 —0.6 —0.6
Interest Paymentsa 6.3 5.9 5.4
Latin America
Real GDP 3.3 4.7 4.8
Terms of Trade —4.7 -0.6 0.2
Export Volume 0.1 7.2 5.1
Import Volume —0.8 2.4 5.4
Current Accounta —14.3 —9.3 —5.7
Interest Paymentsa 25.3 23.1 20.5
apercent of exports of goods and services
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. April 198730
In terms of equation (4) above the IMF outlook places major reliance
on continued large non-interest current account surpluses and on export volume
growth to help contain or reduce debt problems. The fact that the scenarios
allow for growth in imports at roughly the same rates as those of exports is
possible because the starting point is a large noninterest surplus. Hence
maintaining equal growth rates, with unchanged terms of trade, assures that
noninterest surplus are maintained. In other words the IMF assumes that in the
period to 1991 problem debtors will continue to make real resource transfers
to their creditors at present rates.
2.U.S.Adjustment: Implications for Debtor Countries
It is interesting to go beyond the IMF outlook and focus on the
central development in the world economy in the next few years, namely U.S.
adjustment of the twin deficits. Table 15 shows the U.S. macroeconomic data
for the recent years.
Table 15The U.S. External Balance and Net Investment Position
(Billion $exceptas noted)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Int'l. Investment Position 136.2 88.5 4.4 —107.4 —238
Current Account
Total —9.2 —45.6 —112.5 —124.4—147.7
Non—Interest —28.1 —37.0 —131.3 —149.6—170.6
(%ofGNP) —0.9 —1.1 -3.5 —3.7 —4.1
Budget Deficit (%ofGNP) —4.1 —5.6 -4.9 —5.1 —4.6
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve and IMF33
Table 17Consequences for Debtors of U.S. AdjustmentScenarios
Soft Landing Hard Landing
Trade Restrictions Moderate Trouble Debt Default
No Trade Restrictions Major Improvement Moratoria
Table 17 shows strikingly that the debt problem todayremains wide—
open. Sustained U.S. growthwith low real interest rates and unimpaired market
access means debt problems will becomesignificantly smaller. Continued
ability to sell in the U.S. market, higherreal commodity prices which come
with dollar depreciation and lower real interestrates all combine to a
scenario favorable for debtors. Of course, the counterpartof U.S. external
balance improvement in this case is a worseningof the net exports of Europe
and of Japan. But lower real interest rateshave a self—correcting property in
that debtor countries can reduce their noninterestsurplus and yet improve
their creditworthinesSS. This feature meansthat there is not necessarily a
conflict between U.S. and debtor country objectives.When debtor countries
argue for the need to reduce U.S.deficits they presumably have this scenario
in mind.34
The other extreme scenario is a hard landing with trade restrictions.
The consequences are obvious: Recession and high real; interest rates move
debt service problems far beyond what debtor countries an be expected to make
up for by domestic adjustments. Trade restrictions further worsen their
ability to service debts. The almost certain consequence would be 1930 style
debt defaults or indefinite suspension of debt service.
World growth and real interest rates are central in judging the impact
of alternative scenarios for debtor countries. On the side of growth U.S.
fiscal adjustment will tend to reduce growth in the world economy. If U.S.
output growth is sustained this will mean that real depreciation sustains net
exports and that accordingly foreign growth will tend to be less. It is very
unlikely that Europe and Japan will provide an expansion in demand sufficient
to keep world output growth constant. Thus on the growth side the expectation
must be that the performance of the past few years cannot be sustained. But on
the interest rate side there may be a favorable development, if the U.S. does
adjust the budget and sustains growth by lower interest rates the dollar will
depreciate and this is likely force Europe and Japan into interest rate
reductions even if that threatens monetary discipline.
The impact of interest rates on debtors current account balances is,
of course very significant. Table 17 shows estimates of the impact on various
Latin American countries of a 2.5 percentage point reduction in interest
rates. Table 18 shows that the impact on individual debtor countries will35
depend both on their debt ratios and on the fraction of debt that is at
floating rates.
Table 18Interest Saving from a 2.5 Percentage Point Fall in Interest
Rates (Billion $andPercent of Imports of Goods and Services)
$Billion Percent of Imports









The impact of interest rate changes on import availability is very
significant for Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, who are the large borrowers from
commercial banks. For Latin America at large a 2.5 percent reduction interest
rates would amount to a resource saving of nearly 8 percent of total imports.
Hence the importance to debtors of the monetary policies that accompany the
correction of the U.S. deficit.
Trade barriers might not be applied uniformly across U.S. trading
partners. They might be applied only to industrial countries, specifically
Japan, or only to current account surplus countries, rather than to countries
with bilateral surpluses. For debtors the implication here is that an
improvement indebtservice ability of countries like Mexico or Brazil might36
be paid for by extra restrictions on Korea or Taiwan. Thus developing
countries as a group might experience an improvement while specific countries
like Korea bear the burden.
There is another way of looking at debtor countries and U.S.
adjustment. Suppose that the U.S. in fact achieved a $100 billion reduction in
the external deficit. Assume also that this had as a counterpart a $20 billion
improvement in the U.S. bilateral trade balance with Latin America. How can
Latin America experience a $20 billion deterioration in the external balance?
There are only two ways: much lower interest rates or significant extra
financing. Thus any hard landing scenario without default of necessity
involves a dramatic change in financing availability which is not apparent
today.
The focus on the U.S. adjustment problem throws a very different light
on the links between world macroeconomics and debt problems. It suggests that
the steady IMF scenario conceals that there is either good or bad news, but
probably not the balanced no—news outlook implicit in Table 14. Of course, it
is possible that U.S. adjustment is a matter of the more distant future, In
that case the JMF scenario would be more appropriate for the nearterm. But
there wouldinevitablybe an adjustment some time and that might be more
nearly of the hard landing variety.
Is there a chance that debt problems will be solved in some other
fashion by the world macroeconomy? Here one would look to a pattern of terms37
of trade, interest rates and inflation of the 1970—73 variety. Since the U.S.
is already at full employment continuing depreciation and monetary
accommodation, without fiscal contraction, will inevitably raise inflation
while sustaining growth. This policy setting would ease debt problems
significantly. The only question is whether the process of sliding gently into
the soft landing option, with a few years delay, can in fact be achieved. The
monetary authorities would have to be sufficiently accommodating and
impervious to inflation, and asset holders would have to be patient, sitting
out dollar depreciation without a stampede. This does not seem to be a high
probability scenario.
3. The Commodity Price Problem
The final point to raise concerns the longterm behavior of commodity
prices. Figure 6 shows a longterin time series for the real price of
commodities. Although the exact comparisons across periods is impaired by the
fact that these data are spliced from different series the basic point is very
striking.5 Commodity prices inthemid—1980s have reached the lowest level in
real terms since the great depression.
Table 19 The Real Price of Commodities: 1950-1986
(Index 1980100, period averages)
1950—54 124 1975—79 104
1955—59 113 1980—84 94
1960—64 106 1985 85













Several factors explain this low level of commodity prices. The high
level of real interest rates is one and, until 1985—86 the high level of the
dollar was another one. But these factors are not sufficient to explain the
large decline as discussed in Dornbusch (1985). Substitution toward resource
saving technologies on the demand side, real depreciation and hence increased
levels of output at given world real prices are other factors. Capacity
expansion in many producing countries are further factors that reduce real
prices. Finally, for agricultural commodities government support policies in
industrial countries have played an important role.
But this large decline in real commodity prices which has been a
decisive factor in the debt performance of several countries, as for example
Argentina, Bolivia or Peru, may well have bottomed out. Moreover, the recovery
of real commodity prices may turn out to be surprisingly large and rapid.
Certainly the level of real commodity prices is unlikely to return to the high
of the early 1970s because structural factors mitigate so large an increase.
But a resumption of inflation and much lower real interest rates will drive up
inventory demand and thus bring about a significant rise. Indeed, the signs of
such an increase are already quite apparent except for food. In the one year
to August 1987 the Economist index of all commodities increased in dollar
terms by 22.1percent,with industrial commodities rising by 46.4 percent. But
that increase was not shared by food which showed a moderate decline.39
IV. CONCLUSION
World macroeconomicpolicies and variables were until 1981—82 not the
major reason for the present debt crisis. Only in 1981—82 did the sharp
increase in interest rates and the decline in growth help create a crisis in
the aftermath of very poor policy performance in debtor countries.
Since 1982 the world macroeconomic environment has shown an
improvement. Interest rates declined in nominal and real terms and growth has
been sustained, as was expected in 1982. The only surprises were that dollar
overvaluation lasted as long as it did, a smaller decline in real interest
rates and a massive decline in the real prices of commodities. The world
macroeconomic environment certainly did not provide a setting in which debtor
countries could grow out of their debts by export booms and improving terms of
trade.
Today, five years into the adjustment process, indicators of
creditworthiness show a deterioration except for the ratio of debt service to
exports. And even that indicator is barely below the 1982 level. Can we expect
that the world economy in the years ahead provides a distinctly more favorable
setting? The IMP outlook for the period 1988—91 shows a no—news setting:
steady, moderate growth, no changes in the terms of trade and an increase in
real interest rates. In such an environment debtor countries would have to42
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FOOTNOTES
1Countries in this group are characterized by having incurred arrears in
1983 and 1984 or rescheduled their debts in the 1982—85 period.
20n the costs of protection in a situation of credit rationing see
Dornbusch (1985).
3See, for example, Dornbusch (1985, 1987).
4See International Monetary Fund (1986) and Dornbusch (1985).
5See IMF (1987b) pp.90—91 for a discussion of the data.